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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
advance? Probably the only sound solution of this problem
is the rule of the Restatement of Property1' that re-
mainders and executory interests, whether vested or con-
tingent, are fully alienable; and that "the tenuousness of
the remainder or executory interest is material only in
determining the value and constituent characteristics of
the interest acquired by the transferee.' 12
AUTO OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED
BY GUEST PERMITTED TO DRIVE
Powers v. State, use of Reynolds'
At midnight, on November 11, 1938, Raymond Coffman,
Paul E. Powers, and Mary M. Reynolds left a Hagerstown
night club for Hancock, Maryland, from whence they had
motored earlier in the evening in a car owned by Powers.
During the evening each member of the party had drunk
a quantity of intoxicating liquor. Before leaving for Han-
cock, therefore, they all agreed to the common proposal
of letting Coffman drive the Powers car, the reason be-
ing that Powers himself was in no fit condition to drive.
On the return trip the car, while being operated by Coff-
man, struck a guard rail; and as a result Miss Reynolds
was killed. In an action brought under the Maryland
version of Lord Campbell's Act, the plaintiff was success-
ful, and the verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In its majority opinion,2 the Court ruled that Miss Reynolds
was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in riding with a driver whom she knew had been drink-
ing during the evening, and that the automobile owner
who requests or allows another to drive the car while
the owner occupies it is liable for any damage caused by
the driver's negligence in the absence of proof that the
owner abandoned the right of control.
It would seem evident that Maryland follows the weight
of authority in this country in ruling that Miss Reynolds
was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law in riding in a car driven by an intoxicated driver. The
courts are loath to hold, in any instance, an invited guest
21 See. 162.
12 Ibid, Comment (d).
11 A. (2d) 909 (Md. 1940).
The decision of the Court rested on the views of three Judges. A
minority opinion, representing the views of two judges, was also filed.
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in an automobile guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.' The facts of a California case are much
the same as those of Powers v. State. There the guest and
driver together had attended a dance, and during the eve-
ning the guest had repeatedly seen the driver drink in-
toxicating liquor. The court held that whether or not the
guest was guilty of contributory negligence in riding home
with the driver was a question for the jury.4 Many cases
have held, when there is some doubt as to the driver's
ability to drive, that the guest is not guilty of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law in riding with such
person;5 and Maryland has held that when testimony is
conflicting as to the driver's condition, the question of the
guest's contributory negligence should go to the jury.6
In further considering the alleged contributory negli-
gence of Miss Reynolds, it should be borne in mind that
had she not accepted the ride with Powers and Coffman,
she would have been left alone in Hagerstown at a late
hour. The alternatives before her were either to ride home
with an intoxicated driver, or be forced to spend the rest
of the night in a strange city. To be guilty of a voluntary
assumption of risk, the plaintiff must not only know of
the danger, but must encounter it without any reasonable
necessity for doing so.7 It is certainly evident that the con-
duct of Miss Reynolds could not be called a voluntary ex-
posure to an unreasonable risk. It would seem that the
exposure, under the circumstances, was not voluntary,
nor was the risk, in the light of decided cases, unreason-
able.
Although the ruling on Miss Reynold's contributory
negligence is not too difficult to follow, the ruling that
Powers is answerable for the negligence of the driver is
certainly open to question. The theory on which- this lia-
bility was fastened to the car owner was that the par-
ties were in such legal relationship that the negligence
of the driver could be imputed to the car owner. In other
words, the driver was acting, at the time of the accident,
Ford v. Maney's Estate, 251 Mich. 461, 232 N. W. 393. 70 A. L. R.
1315 (1930).
' House v. Schmelzer, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 601, 40 P. (2d) 577 (1935).
5 Anderson et al v. Pickens, 118 Cal. App. 212, 4 P. (2d) 794 (1931);
Beckman v. Wilkins et al, 181 Minn. 245, 232 N. W. 38 (1930) ; Caldbeck
v. Flint. 281 Mass. 360, 183 N. E. 739 (1933) ; Denham v. Taylor, 15 La.
App. 545, 131 So. 614 (1930); Bubar v. Fisher, 134 Me. 10, 180 A. 923
(1935) ; Steele v. Lackey, 107 Vt. 192, 177 A. 309 (1935).
' Meese v. Goodman, 167 Md. 658, 176 A. 621, 98 A. L. R. 480 (1935).
72 RESTATZMENT, TORTS (1934), Sec. 466.
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as the agent of the owner, and under the doctrine of Re-
spondeat Superior the car owner became answerable for
the death of Miss Reynolds. The arguable question in the
last analysis is, therefore, was the relationship between
the car owner and the driver that of principal and agent.'
In some states statutes provide that a car owner is lia-
ble for the negligence of a driver who is operating the
car with the owner's consent.9 The status thus created
by such statutes has been held to be that of agency. °
Other jurisdictions hold a car owner responsible if he per-
mits another to drive while at the same time the owner
retains all dominion and control over the automobile.1
Many of these decisions state that under such circum-
stances the driver becomes the agent of the owner, and
therefore the negligence of the driver is imputed to the
owner. 2 While Maryland has no statute which creates
the relationship of master and servant between car owner
and one who borrows it, yet this state has adopted the
theory that the driver, in such instances, is the agent of
B For the purposes of this casenote, the legal relationship between Powers
and Coffman will be referred to as master and servant, rather than as
principal and agent. These terms have become confused in recent years,
and in many court opinions they are used interchangeably. Strictly
speaking, the terms principal and agent include those of master and
servant. So it is that a master is always a principal and a servant is
always an agent. But it by no means follows that a principal is always a
master, and an agent is always a servant. The chief point of difference
lies in the fact that the word master always connotates a degree of
physical control, and the master always has the right to dominate and
control his servant. This is not true of the principal, however, for in
many cases he has no power physically to control his agent. For many
purposes it is immaterial whether or not one who is an agent Is also a
servant. However, a master Is always liable for the torts of his servant
(within scope of employment) while in many instances a principal is not
liable for the torts of his agent. See 1 RE STATEMENT, AGENcY (1933),
Secs. 1, 2, 219.
B These states now include: Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, New York, Connecticut, and Iowa.
10 2 Am. Jur. 281; Agency, Sec. 361, n. 10.
11 Day v. Isaacson, 124 Me. 407, 130 A. 212 (1925) ; Reetz v. Mansfield,
119 Conn. 563, 178 A. 53 (1935); Bennett v. Edward, 267 N. Y. S. 417
(1933).
12 On principle, the mere presence of the owner in an automobile, at the
time of an injury resulting from its negligent operation while being driven
by another, does not necessarily make him liable, if he would not have
otherwise have been liable. The owner's presence, however, is an impor-
tant element where recovery Is sought on the theory that the operator was
acting as his servant or agent, or that he had control over the operation
of the car. An inference that the machine was being driven by his agent,
or that he had some control over its operation is readily drawn if the owner
was present. The strength of the inference, however, undoubtedly varies
with the circumstances, and it is weakest where the facts show that the
owner had loaned the car, and was riding therein merely as a guest of
the borrower. See Annotation, Owner's Presence in Automobile Operated
by Another as Affecting Former's Liability, 2 A. L. R. 888.
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the owner.'" In arriving at this conclusion, the question
of the power and ability of the owner to direct and con-
trol the driver has been the ultimate test in determining
whether or not a status of agency existed between the
two.'4
In the leading case of Vacek v. State the court held
that where a group of friends accompanied the owner of
an automobile to his residence at a shore resort, and where
one of the friends asked and was allowed to drive the
owner's car on the return trip home, the driver immedi-
ately became the agent of the owner. As a result, any
subsequent negligence on the part of the driver was im-
puted to the owner under the doctrine of Respondeat Su-
perior. The Court held that the theory of agency was
applicable, basing its opinion on the fact that the owner
had the power to direct and control the driver, and also
had the sole power of granting to him the permission to
drive. But to create a status of agency between two par-
ties more is needed than the mere power of one party to
direct and control the other. 5 Additional factors to be
considered are whether or not the parties believed that
they were creating a status of master and servant at the
time the relationship was formed.'" The fact that one as-
sists another, does something for his benefit, or submits
himself to the control of such other does not constitute
such person the servant of the other. There must be con-
sent or manifestation of consent to the existence of the
relationship by the person for whom the service is per-
formed. 17 Moreover, the alleged servant must be in the
pursuit of his master's business before a true status of
agency is created. It is difficult to see in the Vacek case
how there was any agency involved, and it is doubly dif-
ficult to apply the tests of agency to Powers v. State. It
is hard to conceive in either case that the parties intended
that the driver should be the servant of. the owner, or
that the owner intended him to be such a servant. No
actual employment was contemplated in either case, for
in fact, in the Vacek case, the owner of the car was doing
the driver a favor in allowing him to drive. It is even
clearer that the status of the parties in either case was
not that of master and servant when the question is asked,
13 Hooper v. Brawner, 148 Md. 417, 129 A. 672, 42 A. L. R. 14, 37 (1925);
Vacek v. State, use of Rokas, 155 Md. 400, 142 A. 491 (1928).
"Vacek v. State, use of Rokas, 155 Md. 400, 408, 142 A. 491, 494 (1928).
18 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933), Sec. 225.
16 Ibid., Sec. 220.
17 Ibid., Sec. 225, Comment C.
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whose business was the alleged servant pursuing at the
time of the accident. In an action for damages against
the master for his servant's negligent driving of an auto-
mobile, the proof must be clear that the driver, at the
time of the collision, was engaged in his master's busi-
ness.'" But in both the Vacek case and the Powers case
the driver was about his own business when the accident
occurred. In the Powers case Coffman, the driver, did not
take over the wheel because he was employed to drive
Powers home, but rather because he wished to get home
himself, and because in the opinion of all the parties con-
cerned, he was the only member of the group deemed capa-
ble at the time of driving.
The position that when the owner of a car allows an-
other member of a pleasure party to assist in the driving
he does not thereby create a relationship of master and
servant between himself and the driver is not without the
support of decided cases.1" In an Illinois case, the deceased
was riding as a passenger in a car operated by defendant's
brother. The defendant, the owner of the car, was also
a passenger at the time. In answer to a suit brought for
the death of the deceased, the court held that the defend-
ant was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground that
there was no legal evidence proving that at the time of
the accident the car was being driven by an agent of de-
fendant in or about defendant's business."0 A somewhat
similar conclusion was reached in California. There,
where a guest sued both the driver and the owner of a
car for injuries sustained due to the driver's negligence,
and where the evidence showed that the driver had the
owner's permission to drive, but where there was no other
proof of a master-servant relationship, the owner was not
held liable to the guest for the driver's wilful miscon-
duct."' There are other cases supporting the view that
where the owner of a car allows another to drive, there
being no evidence of any employment of the driver by
the owner, and where the driver drove for his own pleas-
ure or business, there was no status of agency between
18 Hock v. Martin, 124 Pa. Supp. 445, 188 A. 602 (1936).
1" Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 A. 166, 80 A. L. R. 280 (1931);
McCoy v. Frutiger, 55 R. I. 492, 182 A. 494 (1936). A Massachusetts case
based the owner's liability for the driver's negligence squarely on his
power to control the driver, when It held that concurrent facts of owner-
ship and occupancy alone did not give rise to liability: Wheeler v. Dar-
mochwat, 280 Mass. 553, 183 N. E. 55 (1932).
20 Paulson, Admrx. v. Cochfield, 278 Ill. App. 596 (1935).
"1 Berryman v. Quinlan et al, 85 P. (2d) 202 (Calif. 1938).
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the two."- Applying these principles to Powers v. State
the result is that it is indeed difficult to see how Coffman,
a member of a joint pleasure party, by agreeing to drive
Power's car who was also a member of the party, there-
by became the servant of Powers. If this conclusion is
sound, the doctrine of Respondeat Superior should not ap-
ply to the Powers case.
But even if it is conceded that the Vacek case and the
Powers case are sound when they state that the driver
acted as the servant of the owner, yet there is still another
problem with which to be dealt. This question, which
is clearly presented in the Powers case, is if the driver
was the servant of the car owner, why was he not also the
servant of the guest? In other words was not Coffman the
servant of Miss Reynolds as well as he was the servant of
Powers? Coffman was appointed driver by the insistence
of each member of the party, Miss Reynolds taking as
much a part in his selection as did Powers. It therefore
follows that if Coffman is to be considered the legal rep-
resentative of one, he must be considered the legal rep-
resentative of all. It was stated in evidence that, after
the car left Hagerstown, Powers occupied the back seat.
His intoxicated condition would imply that his power to
direct and control Coffman was little if any greater than
that exercised by Miss Reynolds. Be that as it may, if
Coffman is to be considered as an agent at all, he must
be considered an agent for joint principals. It is not un-
common for a person to be the servant of two masters
at one time, and as to one act.23 Since Coffman must be
considered the servant of both Powers and Miss Reynolds,
the latter must be held just as responsible for the servant's
negligence as was the former.
From the foregoing discussion, it has been seen that
the liability of Powers for the death of Miss Reynolds
turned on the theory of the legal relationship between the
parties of a pleasure outing. For in determining that legal
relationship it was felt that the negligence of the driver
could be imputed to the owner of the car, thereby mak-
ing him guilty of actionable negligence. It was pointed
out in the court's opinion that the members of the party
did not constitute the members of a joint enterprise. But
it is difficult to see, in the absence of any controlling stat-
" Union Bank of Chicago v. Kalkhurst, 265 Ill. App. 254 (1932) ; Woods
v. Franklin, 151 Miss. 635. 118 So. 450 (1928); Rosenberg v. Karas, 259
Mass. 568, 156 N. E. 711 (1927).
2 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933), Sec. 226.
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ute, how any negligence could be imputed to the car owner,
in this particular case, on the theory of agency. Is there,
then, any theory by which the negligence may be fixed on
Powers, which would make him responsible for the un-
fortunate accident? There does seem to be a theory, in
line with decided Maryland cases, which might fix the lia-
bility on Powers under the existing facts.
It has been decided in Maryland that if one entrusts
his car to a person, incompetent at the time to drive, this
in itself will be a negligent act for which the owner must
suffer the consequences. 4 Berry, in his work on automo-
biles, says that aside from the relation of master and serv-
ant the owner of an automobile may be rendered liable
for injuries inflicted by its operation by one whom he has
permitted to drive, on the grounds that such person, by
reason of his physical condition is incompetent to safely
operate the machine. 25  This rule has been followed in
Maryland.21 In a case, the facts of which somewhat re-
semble Powers v. State, where the owner of a car allowed
an intoxicated person to drive, and as a result the plain-
tiff was injured, the Court said:
"It is not necessary to determine the nature of the
legal relation between the defendant and Bridges,
which, according to plaintiff's proof existed at the
time of the accident. Apart from the question as to
whether it was such a relation as would ordinarily
have made defendant responsible for the negligence
of Bridges, the submission of the case to the jury was
justified by the evidence, which tended to charge de-
fendant himself with negligence in committing to an
intoxicated person the duty of testing the steering
efficiency of the truck.2 7
It would seem, therefore, that if the Powers case had
been based more on the theory of the owner's initial act
of negligence, rather than on the driver's subsequent neg-
ligence which was then imputed to the owner, the ulti-
mate decision could be more easily understood. If the
decision be sound in its conclusion it would at least be
easier to follow, if it were based on the car owner's own
negligence, and not on the expanded doctrines of the law
of agency.
21 Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips et al, 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1933), noted
(1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 288.
25BEnuY, AUToMoaE (6th ed.). See. 1327.
26 Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips et al, 166 Md. 151, 163, 170 A. 532, 536 (1938).
2, Dorman v. Koontz, 164 Md. 535, 537, 165 A. 461 (1933).
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